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INTRODUCTION
The law of unintended consequences is inescapable. Although the
criticism of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) reached a
height more than a decade ago, the damaging effects this law has on
innovation continues to this day. Section 1201 of the DMCA contains
prohibitions on the use of and trafficking in technologies that “effectively
control[] access to work[s]” protected under the Copyright Act (the “anticircumvention provisions”). In a commendable effort to hedge against their
own inability to foresee changes in the landscape of technology, Congress
created a power in the Librarian of Congress (“LOC”) to establish exemptions
to the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions every three years.1 However,
such a grant of power only underscores how well Congress is aware that the
DMCA could hinder innovation and consumer choice, and how that body is
consequently forced to play defense against the negative effects of the law.
Congress is forced to consider and ratify the selective exemptions that the
LOC chooses to make regarding who should be exempted.
A recent controversy involving this section of the DMCA is responsible
for the Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act
(“Consumer Choice Act”), signed into law by President Obama.2 Starting in
2006, the Copyright Office recognized an exemption to §1201 that would
allow for consumers to unlock their cellphones—a process by which an
individual purchaser would be able to take a phone purchased, for instance, at
an AT&T store and use it on Verizon’s network.3 This exemption was
renewed in 2010, but in 2013 the Copyright Office refused to renew it again.4
When the exemption was lost, a petition was created on WhiteHouse.gov that
fetched over 114,000 signatures in favor of allowing cell phone unlocking.5
The Consumer Choice Act was the result of coordination between the
“FCC, industry, and Congress,” and allowed consumers “to use their phones
or mobile devices on any network they choose.”6 This law enshrines the
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2014).
2. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement from the President on Unlocking
Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, (July 25, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/07/25/statement-president-unlocking-consumer-choice-and-wireless-competitiona.
3. Recommendation from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James Billington,
Librarian of Cong. (Nov. 17, 2006) available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201
_recommendation.pdf.
4. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
5. Jeff Zients and Sen. Patrick Leahy, Answering the Public’s Call, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/08/01/answering-publics-call.
6. President Barack Obama, supra note 2.
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previously retracted exemption that allows users of cell phones to unlock their
devices without running afoul of §1201 of the DMCA.7 Thus, the legislation
officially recognizes a practice that should have arguably never been
proscribed by copyright law.8 No actual copyright infringement was at issue
when users simply wanted to use their cellphones on different networks. The
DMCA, in this case, was merely a set of handcuffs locking consumers into a
particular consumption pattern preferred by device manufacturers and
network carriers. Moreover, this one fairly narrow, mundane issue—
consumer choice in the use of cellphones – hints at the untold existence of
other possible alternate uses of devices and technologies that are kept from
the market because of fears that they won’t pass muster under §1201.
For instance, it is easy to imagine that the recent anti-trust action against
Keurig manufacturer Green Mountain Coffee could provide the groundwork
for §1201 actions to enforce Green Mountain’s market dominance.9 In the
Keurig case, Treehouse Foods has sued Green Mountain for violating the
Sherman Act on the grounds that Green Mountain will begin to issue new
machines that are only capable of reading their own proprietary label format.10
Assuming for the moment that Green Mountain prevails on this action and are
able to manufacture these new software-protected machines, it is a short leap
of legal reasoning away to connect the coffee makers to the DMCA. Green
Mountain makes an effective technological protection measure pre-loaded on
their coffee makers. A competitor who wants to sell coffee K-Cups to the
very large Keurig market would need to create labels that are compatible with

7. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act Managers’
Amendment to S.517, https://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/onepager_-unlocking-consumerchoice-and-wireless-competition-act (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
8. Id. Much of the criticism around § 1201 has involved the observation that it can be used to
create business advantage, even without copyright infringement. In the hearings to the cellphone
locking bill, Representative Zoe Lofgren notes that, “[i]t’s not Congress’ role to tell people the
business model they should use[.]” Bryan Suchenski, Does Congress Mean to Enforce Particular
Business Models with Copyright Law? PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE BLOG, ¶ 4, (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.
publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/does-congress-mean-to-enforce-particular-business-modelswith-copyright-law. Moreover, at the same hearing, Stephen Metalitz, an attorney for several large
rights-holders, went so far as to observe that the specific intention of § 1201 was not just to protect
copyright, but also to protect specific business models. Id. at ¶ 12.
9. In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81170 (J.P.M.L. June 9, 2014). See also Karl Bode, Keurig Will Use DRM In New Coffee Maker To
Lock Out Refill Market, TECHDIRT (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:32 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20140704/07112927780/keurig-begins-demonstrating-its-coffee-drm-system-as-expected-ithas-nothing-to-do-with-safety.shtml; Mike Masnick, Keurig Begins Demonstrating Its Coffee DRM
System; As Expected, It Has Nothing To Do With ‘Safety’, TECHDIRT (JULY 9, 2014, 8:51 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140227/06521826371/keurig-will-use-drm-new-coffee-makerto-lock-out-refill-market.shtml.
10. In re Keurig, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81170 at *3.
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the software in the machines, and to do so would be effectively bypassing a
technological protection measure. Thus, an action to protect the market share
of a coffee machine manufacturer would fall very plausibly within the ambit
of the DMCA—a law ostensibly written to protect the copyright interests of
rights holders.
However, the focus on what exemptions the LOC will recognize, and
when Congress will fully authorize them by statute, is something of a
sideshow—at least when judged against the entire framework of §1201 and
certain defects therein. In the jurisprudence surrounding the DMCA, there yet
remains a circuit split regarding important implications of new property rights
arguably, and accidentally, created in the anti-circumvention provisions.
Thus, the viability of this law as it is sometimes being applied is far from
certain until it reaches the Supreme Court.
Section 1201(a) specifically forbids the circumvention of technological
protection measures (“TPM”) that effectively control access to a work
protected under the Copyright Act.11 By contrast, §1201(b) prohibits
trafficking in devices that enable third parties to circumvent TPMs that
effectively protect a right of a copyright holder guaranteed under the
Copyright Act.12 Therefore, §1201(a) appears to provide a cause of action
when someone merely circumvents a protection measure, regardless of
whether a particular right of a copyright holder is violated, whereas §1201(b)
requires that the measure in question actually be in service of protecting a
right granted under the Copyright Act.
The Federal Circuit has held that §1201(a), despite its broad language,
could not reasonably be read to mean that it was forbidden to circumvent a
TPM, when that measure has no connection to an actual right guaranteed
under the Copyright Act.13 In the view of the Federal Circuit, without a nexus
between circumvention and the infringement of a right, §1201(a) would create
a nearly unbounded new property right that extends far beyond the scope of
what one would consider a copyright.14
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit believes that the plain language of the text
of §1201(a), coupled with certain readings of the legislative history, compel it
to recognize a broad access control right.15 In reaching its holding, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged the arguments underlying the Federal Circuit’s opinion,
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
amended
2011).

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
Id. at § 1201(b).
Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id.
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) opinion
and superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17,
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and dismissed them as mere policy considerations.16
This Paper examines the tensions between these two positions. Much of
the reasoning in both opinions turned on statutory interpretation techniques,
with each court relying on a different set of suppositions regarding how best
to interpret §1201. Ultimately, this Paper will take the position that the
Federal Circuit is on the better constitutional and statutory interpretation
ground for various reasons, and that the Supreme Court should see §1201 as
requiring an infringement nexus.
Part I of this Paper describes in more detail the tension between the Ninth
Circuit and the Federal Circuit regarding the proper construction of §1201.
Part II then examines the constitutional implications of the Ninth Circuit’s “no
nexus” position. Part III moves on to examine the various statutory
interpretation techniques employed by both courts, and the strengths and
weaknesses of each.
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT: SKYLINK AND MDY
A. Skylink
Chamberlain v. Skylink is a seminal case in the Federal Circuit dealing
with §1201 anti-circumvention interpretation.17 In Chamberlain, the Federal
Circuit held that, in order to succeed under a §1201(a)(2) access violation
claim, a plaintiff must show that the circumventing technology infringes or
facilitates others in infringing some right guaranteed to the plaintiff under the
Copyright Act.18 This requirement has been called the “infringement nexus
requirement.”19
The plaintiff, Chamberlain, a seller of garage door systems, protected its
garage doors with a security system based on a “rolling code.”20 This rolling
code system continually rotated the transmitter frequency needed to open the
door, thus allowing enhanced security against criminal entry.21 The
defendant, Skylink, manufactured a universal transmitter system that was
designed to interoperate with a variety of garage door systems, including the
plaintiff’s.22 Chamberlain sued Skylink under §1201(a)(2), alleging that
Skylink’s garage door opening system evaded a TPM embodied in the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203.
Id.
MDY, 629 F.3d at 948.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1185.
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“rolling code” system.23 Therefore, by selling such systems, Chamberlain
alleged that Skylink had trafficked in devices designed to circumvent TPMs,
and was in violation of §1201(a)(2).24
The district court found for Skylink, basing its holding on the idea that,
because Chamberlain had never restricted its customers’ use of competing
transmitters, the customers were implicitly authorized to use Skylink’s
product.25 Thus, with the implied authorization, there was no unauthorized
access in violation of §1201.26
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court, but it did so on other
grounds.
The Federal Circuit held that without either a copyright
infringement, or the facilitation of infringement, §1201(a)(2) could not be
applied.27 In so doing, the Federal Circuit opined that the access provision
was necessarily tied to a copyright owner’s rights, and could not operate as a
free-floating provision.28 Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of §1201(a)(2),
the DMCA did not create a brand new access right unmoored from the rights
guaranteed under §106 of the Copyright Act.29 The rights provided by
§1201(a)(2) were to a new cause of action, and not to a new form of property
right.30 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that, in order to prevail under
§1201(a)(2), a plaintiff needed to demonstrate a reasonable relationship
between the circumvention device and the potential for it to violate a §106
right.31
The Federal Circuit clarified how §1201(a)(2) functions by describing
three possible situations: (1) parties that traffic in circumvention devices may
be subject to liability whether they infringe or not, because their devices are
capable of allowing others to infringe; (2) parties that use such devices could
theoretically be liable for infringement per se under §106; and (3) parties who
provide circumvention devices that do not facilitate infringement, but
nonetheless enable the circumvention of an access control measure, will not
be subject to §1201 liability.32 The upshot of the Federal Circuit’s position is
that §1201(a)(2) did not create a new right, but only a new cause of action
linked to the rights already guaranteed under the Copyright Act.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1187–88
Id.
Id. at 1202–03.
Id.
Id. at 1192–93.
Id.
Id. at 1195.
Id.

STOUT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

190

5/15/2015 1:42 PM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 19:2

Chamberlain based its holding on a number of factors, several of which
are relevant for our purposes here. Citing legislative history, the court noted
that the DMCA was enacted in order to create a workable balance between
users and content providers in the new digital age.33 Reasoning from this
proposition, the Federal Circuit believed that a nexus requirement was
necessary in order to properly strike that balance.34 More importantly, the
Federal Circuit recognized that an access control right unmoored from the
§106 rights would allow copyright holders license to act in undesirable
ways.35 For instance, a copyright holder could defeat Fair Use defenses
merely by wrapping content in an effective, if technologically trivial,
protection measure.36 Chamberlain also recognized the possibility of “absurd
and disastrous results” that would follow from reading §1201(a)(2) literally.37
Among these was, for instance, the possibility of treating a home burglar
alarm as an effective access control measure on the copyrighted books within
a residence, leading to liability under the DMCA for disabling the burglar
alarm.38 As the court observed:
[According to] Chamberlain’s proposed construction, explicated at
oral argument, disabling a burglar alarm to gain “access” to a home
containing copyrighted books, music, art, and periodicals would
violate the DMCA; anyone who did so would unquestionably have
“circumvented a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].” . . . The
appropriate deterrents to this type of behavior lie in tort law and
criminal law, not in copyright law. Yet, were we to read the statute’s
“plain language” as Chamberlain urges, disabling a burglar alarm
would be a per se violation of the DMCA.39
Further, Chamberlain noted that Congress’s authority to enact the DMCA
was questionable, and some constructions of the statute could run afoul of the
Constitution.40 The court noted that a nexus requirement must exist within the

33. Id. at 1196 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 26 (1998)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1201.
36. Id. The Ninth Circuit is not alone in disagreeing with the Federal Circuit in this regard.
In Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit held
that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions were unconcerned with the use to which content was
put once the TPMs were bypassed. This extended to even possible Fair Uses.
37. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1200.

STOUT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/15/2015 1:42 PM

COPYRIGHTS WITHOUT LIMITS

191

law in order to make it a rational use of power because, otherwise, the bare
language could lead to the creation of monopoly over public domain works.41
Without an infringement nexus, a party could add a trivial amount of
copyrighted material together with expired or otherwise public domain
content. If he then adds a simple protection scheme to the combined content,
under the DMCA, he would obtain a right over the public domain content he
could not otherwise have had.42 For instance, imagine that a previously
unknown Shakespeare manuscript is discovered, the authorship of which is
proven beyond dispute. Technically, this work should exist in the public
domain. However, imagine that the discoverer writes a forward for the piece,
and packages it together in a paid digital download that is acquired only after
acknowledging a restrictive licensing agreement. Reverse engineering the
protection on said file in order to extract the purely public domain content
would amount to a violation of §1201, even though the content being sought
is strictly public domain material.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit observed that without an infringement
nexus, the Copyright Act could become contradictory.43 The court observed
that §1201(c)(1) explicitly directs that “nothing in this section shall affect
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including
Fair Use, under this title.”44 Under the Federal Circuit’s view, if §1201(a)(2)
truly were creating a new right unmoored from the §106 list of rights, it would
be in effect altering rights, remedies and defenses under the Copyright Act.45
According to the Federal Circuit, “[a] provision that prohibited access without
regard to the rest of the Copyright Act would clearly affect rights and
limitations, if not remedies and defenses” that would “flatly contradict
§1201(c)(1).”46
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Skylink, having neither infringed a
right nor enabled infringement, was not liable under §1201(a)(2).47

41. Id.
42. This particular example contemplates material that may be rare in some fashion, but
otherwise considered public domain.
43. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Note again that this stands in contrast to the Second Circuit’s position regarding Fair
Use and the DMCA. In considering whether § 1201(c)(1) does in fact prohibit expanding a broad
access right, the Second Circuit held that “the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls
guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention tools), but does not concern itself
with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.” Universal City Studios v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001).
47. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200.
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B. MDY
MDY v. Blizzard involved a dispute over the use of third party software to
alter the game playing experience of the popular online role-playing game
World of Warcraft (“WoW”).48 WoW provides a real-time simulated fantasy
world in which users create characters, such as elves and orcs, and amass
experience, equipment, and virtual gold.49 Within WoW there were various
player-to-player and in-game facilities that enabled users to acquire virtual
gold and in-game equipment.50 Michael Donnely (“MDY”) wrote a computer
program, know as a “bot,” called “Glider” that would automatically play a
person’s characters in WoW.51 This allowed such users to more quickly
advance through the game than users who did not employ the bot software.52
Before a user can access the WoW virtual world they must agree to an
End User License Agreement (“EULA”) as well as a Terms of Use (“TOU”)
policy.53 Although initially Blizzard may not have explicitly disallowed the
use of bots in their EULA or TOU, by late 2005 MDY was admittedly aware
that bot use was considered a violation of Blizzard’s TOU.54 To combat the
use of bots, Blizzard created a program named “Warden” that scanned the
user’s computer to detect bot usage.55 When such a user was found, that user
was banned from WoW.56 In response, MDY continuously modified Glider
to evade detection and enable users to continue violating Blizzard’s TOU,
even after the period in which it was clear that bots were disallowed in
WoW.57
The exact extent of Glider’s impact on the WoW experience for nonGlider users, as well as on Blizzard was disputed.58 Blizzard claimed that
thousands of users reported complaints about others using Glider.59 Blizzard
also claimed that it spent nearly $1M each year in order to respond to the
complaints of unauthorized bots.60 Further, MDY explicitly made its anti48. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 936.
55. Id. at 935–36.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 936.
58. Id. at 935–36.
59. Id. at 936.
60. Id. Blizzard claimed it received 465,000 complaints, of which “several thousand” named
Glider. Thus, the full cost of $1,000,000 would not be directly attributable to Glider, although, some
significant percentage would be so attributable.
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detection software in such a way as to waste Blizzard’s resources when it tried
to root out the bot usage.61 The goal for MDY was “to make it bad business
to spend that much time altering their detection code to find Glider[.]”62
There were two primary causes of action in MDY. First, Blizzard asserted
a claim of contributory or vicarious copyright infringement that focused on an
aspect of the case not relevant to the subject of this Paper.63 In the second
issue, however, Blizzard alleged that MDY was liable under §1201 of the
DMCA for creating and distributing the technological means of defeating
Warden, Blizzard’s access protection measure for WoW.64
The district court held that MDY’s program violated both §1201(a) (the
access provision) as well as §1201(b) (the “rights” provision) by allowing
users of WoW to bypass the Warden program when playing the game online.
As will be discussed in depth, infra, the Ninth Circuit agreed, ultimately
holding that §1201(a) creates, in essence, a right of action for copyright
holders that does not depend on an actual violation of their statutorily granted
rights in 17 U.S.C. §106.65
Primarily, the Ninth Circuit reached this result by parsing the plain text of
§1201.66 First, the court noted that §1201(a) and §1201(b) explicitly point out
the basis upon which protection is afforded.67 On the one hand, §1201(a)(2)
is directed only to “works protected under [the Copyright Act,]” while
§1201(b)(1) is concerned with the “right of a copyright owner under [the
Copyright Act.]” The court treated this textual difference as indicating that
§1201(b)(1) required a violation of the rights guaranteed under §106 of the
Copyright Act, while §1201(a)(2) intended to create a new right for copyright
holders to “prevent circumvention of access controls . . . [on] copyrighted
works.”68
Second, the court observed that the examples given in the DMCA to
illustrate what it means to “circumvent a technological measure” were things
such as “descrambling a scrambled work” or “decrypting an encrypted
work.”69 Neither of these activities is per se an activity that infringes upon a
right guaranteed in §106.70 The Ninth Circuit also noted that §1201(a)(1)(B)61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 938–42.
Id. at 942.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 944–46.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id.
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(D) directed the Library of Congress to determine uses of copyrighted works
that were non-infringing, but would otherwise run afoul of the Access
provision.71
The Ninth Circuit rested the balance of its opinion upon legislative
history, observing that the Senate Judiciary Committee felt that §1201(a) did
not require an anti-circumvention clause, but only an anti-trafficking clause,
because the current copyright law as of the enactment of the DMCA already
prohibited infringement.72 Therefore, the law needed only create a ban on
trafficking in the tools that enabled infringement.73 By contrast, there had
been no right available generally providing for copyright holders that allowed
them to prevent others from circumventing access control measures.74
Finally, the Ninth Circuit then characterized the Federal Circuit’s nexus
requirement as being born out of policy considerations.75 Once so
characterized, the Ninth Circuit believed such considerations were only for
Congress to consider, and that the Federal Circuit had failed to recognize the
proper statutory construction that supported its decision in MDY.76
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NO-NEXUS APPROACH
The Ninth Circuit felt that the text of §1201 totally controlled its
decision77—an assertion that will be examined in detail in Part III, infra.
However, even assuming that courts are bound to strictly interpret only the
bare words contained in a statute, there are problematic constitutional
implications with the manner in which the Ninth Circuit has read the scope of
§1201 in MDY.
To understand the nature of this dilemma, we must first examine the
source of Congress’s power to enact the DMCA. At least two possible
constitutional justifications exist for Congress’s promulgation of the DMCA:
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause. Each will be examined in
turn.
A. The Copyright Clause
Section 1201 of the Copyright Act, the DMCA’s provisions relating to the

71. Id. at 945–56.
72. Id. at 945.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 950.
76. Id.
77. The court felt further analysis beyond the text was unnecessary “because of the clarity of
the statute’s text.” Id.
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circumvention of TPMs, is authorized pursuant to some particular grant of
Constitutional power to Congress. The power to create laws governing
copyrights, and thus the power to create the Copyright Act, flows from Article
I, §8, Clause 8 (“Copyright Clause”) of the United States Constitution. This
clause provides that Congress “shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”
Indeed, in a seminal case recognizing the requirement that a work must be
sufficiently creative in order to advance the progress of the useful arts, the
Second Circuit observed that the Copyright Act would be void were it not to
serve the ends strictly provided for in the Copyright Clause.78 Moreover, the
courts are obliged to construe the provisions of the Copyright Act, if possible,
in such a way that their operation falls within the ambit of the Copyright
Clause.79 Although earlier courts had speculated that Congress might have
the ability to regulate copyrights under its Commerce Clause power,80
Congress itself has foreclosed that possibility as of the 1976 act.81 Therefore,
in order to be a valid exercise of power, any provision within the Copyright
Act must be directed toward the securing of some exclusive right to a
protected work.
It should also be noted that the protection of copyrights within the United
States is wholly statutory.82 The earlier distinction between federal and
common law copyrights has largely diminished.83 Before 1978, there had
been some room for common law to operate in the area of unpublished

78. “The first question with which we must deal is that of the validity of the copyright. Our
starting point must be the Constitution. For, as the [C]onstitutional power to enact the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C.A. § 1 [(1976)] et seq., derives from Article 1, Sec. 8, that Act would be void if it went
beyond granting monopolies (or exclusive franchises) to authorize whose works ‘promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.’ . . . [W]e must, if possible, so construe the statute as to avoid
holding it unconstitutional.” Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 512–13 (2d Cir. 1945).
79. Id.
80. Chamberlin, 150 F.2d at 512; Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.)
(patent case), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942).
81. “[T]here is no intention to deal with the question of whether Congress can or should offer
the equivalent of copyright protection under some constitutional provision other than the patentcopyright clause of article 1, section 8.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976). See Dowling v.
United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
82. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908) superseded by statute
on other grounds, London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 182 (D. Mass. 2008)
and M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 1986); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“copyright property under the Federal is wholly statutory, and
depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the authority
conferred under (the Copyright Clause)”).
83. 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 2.02 (2014).
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works.84 However, since 1978, §301(a) of the Copyright Act has fully
preempted common law for all works that fall under the ambit of federal
copyright law statutes.85 Therefore, the rights that the Copyright Act protects
must be enumerated somewhere within the Copyright Act itself, and cannot
be implied from a background common law.
The question asked herein is whether the access right provided for in
§1201 satisfies the foregoing Constitutional sketch by providing rights holders
with a cause of action to vindicate an enumerated right guaranteed under the
Copyright Act? The Copyright Clause is admittedly somewhat undertheorized in both the case law and the legislative history of the clause.86
However, from a textual perspective, the Copyright Clause directs that
Congress protect “the exclusive Right” to works of content creators for
limited times.
As described above, without the benefit of a common law property right
operating in the background of the federal law, the nature of a right must be
explicitly defined. Section 106 of the Copyright Act, for instance, enumerates
a specific set of well-defined rights that the federal law protects. By contrast,
§1201(a)(2) prohibits the violation of a nebulous access right nowhere else
defined within the Copyright Act. Section 1201 expands by implication the
set of rights guaranteed by §106 to essentially include the right of controlling
the mode of accessing a work, even when the access itself would not violate
the terms of §106.
Under a literal reading of §1201(a), “owners of a work protected by both
copyright and a technological measure that effectively controls access to that
work . . . would possess unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable . . .
merely for accessing that work, even if that access enabled only rights that the
Copyright Act grants to the public.”87 This is, of course, contrasted by the
Ninth Circuit’s position in MDY, as well as by the Second Circuit’s position
in Corley that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions were unconcerned
with the use to which content was put once the TPMs were bypassed88—
84. Id.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2014).
86. 1-1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.02 (2014);
“There was very little discussion of the Intellectual Property Clause among the Framers; there is no
record of any debate over it at the Federal Convention.” Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property
and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 338 (2004) (emphasis original). See Thomas B.
Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
33, 65 (2003) (“We know almost nothing about the process of authorship or of authors’
responsiveness to the incentives offered them by the copyright system; it is virtually certain that the
Framers knew even less.”).
87. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200–02 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001).
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possible Fair Uses of such content notwithstanding.89 Nonetheless, the Federal
Circuit’s position represents at least another tension within the current
jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of §1201 that can only to be
resolved by the Supreme Court. A further problem, as the court in
Chamberlain observed, is that an unbounded access right potentially expands
a party’s entitlements to include capturing public domain works.90
Thus, if the Ninth Circuit is correct that Congress intended to allow
§1201(a)(2) to operate without a nexus between circumvention and the
violation of a protected right, 1201(a)(2) may violate the scope of
Congressional power outlined in the Copyright Clause.
1. Paracopyright and the Commerce Clause
It is also possible to conceptualize the DMCA as an exercise of the
Commerce Clause power. In United States v. Elcom,91 the District Court for
the Northern District of California was faced with a constitutional challenge
to the DMCA on the grounds that it exceeded the constitutional limitations of
the Copyright Clause.92 The Elcom court recognized that the DMCA was not
in fact a true enactment under the Copyright Clause, but was instead a sort of
“paracopyright” statute that was validly enacted under the Commerce
Clause.93
However, as the Elcom court recognized, Congress cannot use the
Commerce Clause to eradicate a limitation on its power granted under another
clause.94 To resolve this issue, the Elcom court held that:
If the statute passed by Congress “is not fundamentally inconsistent
with” the Intellectual Property clause and is otherwise within
Congress’ Commerce Power to enact, then the statute is not an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power.95
The Elcom court then recognized that the DMCA, even if merely
paracopyright, was consistent with the Copyright Clause because it provided
the economic incentives that promote the progress of the arts.96

89. Id.
90. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200. See discussion supra Part II(a).
91. United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1140.
94. Id. at 1139 (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999));
see also Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982).
95. Id. at 1139–40.
96. Id. at 1140.
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However, it is important to note, that under Elcom’s reasoning if there
was in fact a “fundamental inconsistency” with the Copyright Clause in the
interpretation of a statute, such interpretation would be improper,
constitutionally speaking.97 Thus, Congress is not entitled to use its very
broad Commerce Power to make an end-run around a limitation imposed
upon it by the Copyrights Clause.
Other courts and commentators have likewise recognized that Congress
cannot evade the limits of one clause of the Constitution by resort to another.
Professor Perzanowski has observed that “[u]nless the limits of Clause 8 cabin
the commerce power, those limits are effectively stricken from the
Constitution, despite the Framers’ best efforts to ensure that they could not be
ignored.”98 Further, in Moghadan, the 11th Circuit held that an exercise of
Commerce power is bound by the Copyright clause to the extent that the
regulation in question is fundamentally inconsistent with Congress’s
Copyright power.99
Other courts have proposed a different test for determining when
Congress exceeds its Copyright power. In United States v. Martignon, for
instance, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
statutes enacted under the Commerce Power that provided “copyright-like”
rights should be bound under the Copyright Clause limitations.100 In
determining whether a statute was “copyright-like,” the court used the fact
that the statute it was examining was placed within Title 17 as persuasive
evidence.101
What is suggested here is not that the entire DMCA is unconstitutional, as
was argued in Elcom. Neither is it here the contention that §1201 is per se
unconstitutional. Instead, the contention is that the manner in which the Ninth
Circuit has read §1201 leads to a constitutional paradox that creates a
fundamental inconsistency with the Copyright Clause.
As noted in Elcom and Railway Labor Executives, Congress cannot use

97. Id.
98. Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on QuasiCopyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081, 1082 (2008).
99. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
100. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and
remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
101. Id. On appeal, the District Court was overturned. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit did not directly rebuke the notion that Congress may be limited in its Commerce power but a
limitation within the Copyright Act. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152. The Second Circuit felt that the
balance of how “copyright-like” the statute in question was did not balance in favor of finding it an
exercise of Copyright power. Id. However, according to at least one commentator, the Second
Circuit missed the entire point of the District Court’s analysis. Perzanowski, supra note 98, at 1140.
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the Commerce Clause to evade a limitation of the Copyright Clause.102 Under
the terms of the Copyright Clause, Congress must secure to authors a limited
monopoly on their own works. Moreover, the purpose of the Copyright
Clause is to give the public appropriate access to such works.103
However, as noted in Part II(a), supra, under the Ninth Circuit’s reading
of §1201, individuals could assert property right claims over both public
domain works as well as the copyrighted works of others. The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged and dismissed this position by characterizing the Chamberlain
concerns as policy driven and consequently subordinate to a plain text reading
of §1201(a)(2).104 Elcom felt similarly about the potential use of the DMCA
to monopolize public domain works when it said that “[n]othing within the
DMCA grants any rights to anyone in any public domain work. A public
domain work remains in the public domain and any person may make use of
the public domain work for any purpose.”105
However, merely because the Ninth Circuit or the court in Elcom may
wish to dismiss this concern does not make it invalid. The situation remains
that without a nexus requirement, the Ninth Circuit’s reading of §1201
provides no principled basis for excluding the Federal Circuit’s concerns. It is
entirely possible that a person could obtain some public domain work that is
in limited supply, reproduce it and protect it with a technological measure that
grants to them an exclusive control over the public domain work that they
would not have otherwise been able to obtain. When coupled with a licensing
agreement, a party will be able to reap a monopolistic profit on a work that
should otherwise be available in the public domain.
Section 1201 essentially converts copyright protection from a scheme
intended to reward authors for original works of creativity into a way of
rewarding companies that invest in developing technological barriers around
content. While there is nothing wrong, per se, with rewarding the efforts of
companies who are in the business of developing such protection measures,
surely it is perverse to rely upon a copyright law in order to ensure their
profits.
Therefore, under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce clause, the

102. “Railway Labor, Perry, and the Head Money Cases all embrace the notion that limits
contained within one enumerated power can constrain legislation otherwise permissible under
another grant of authority.” Id. at 1094.
103. Under the Copyright Clause, Congress is directed to “the task of defin[e] the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access
to their work product.” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003)).
104. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).
105. United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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Ninth Circuit’s application of §1201 may be constitutionally problematic. As
noted above, the Ninth Circuit’s reading of §1201 appears to be outside the
scope of the Copyright Clause. Further, since the Commerce Clause cannot
be used to end run around the limitations of the Copyright Clause, and the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation leads to implications that are squarely at odds
with the Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause cannot justify the Ninth
Circuit’s reading.
III. THE ACCESS RIGHT AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The ideal court opinion marries fidelity to the statutory scheme with
salutary incentives. Unfortunately, that amiable synthesis is unavailable,
insofar as the anti-circumvention statute is concerned . . . the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998 . . . has led to a situation in which no
perfect judicial construction presents itself.106
The Ninth Circuit essentially dismissed the Federal Circuit’s concerns
over the alteration of the scope of rights and remedies related to copyright.107
It opined that the creation of a new access right somehow evaded expanding
or altering the “rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement”108 without explaining why.109 It is here that the Ninth Circuit
appears to be hanging its hat when it characterizes the Federal Circuit’s
concerns as mere policy considerations, and its own holding as firmly rooted
in the text of §1201. However, the Federal Circuit’s holding could be read a
couple of different ways: either as a set of policy concerns, or as an
expression of the ambiguity contained within the Access provision in the
context of the Copyright Act and the DMCA. Although the Ninth Circuit
preferred to view the issue as open and shut, citing the “clarity of the statute’s
text,”110 the possibilities raised by the Federal Circuit highlight the Ninth
Circuit’s problematic construction of §1201.
Given this situation, the circuit split in question requires a careful
statutory interpretation analysis.111 Based on the concerns raise by the Ninth
Circuit and the Federal Circuit, the relevant canons to consider are (1)
textualism, (2) legislative history, (3) the rule against superfluities, and (4) the
106. 3-12A MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 12A.06
(2014).
107. MDY, 629 F.3d at 950.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)(2014).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Before undertaking this endeavor, it is of course important to note that § 1201 is
statutory law, and not constitutional law. Therefore, Congress is at liberty to redefine the law as it
sees fit, even if this split reaches the Supreme Court.
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golden rule, which guards against absurd results. Following a discussion of
the canons and how they apply to the anti-circumvention provisions, I will
examine some of the pragmatic concerns around statutory interpretation,
including institutional concerns and recent empirical research that
demonstrates how the aforementioned canons have been received by the
Supreme Court.
A. Canons of Interpretation
1. Textualism
The first battleground over the proper interpretation of §1201 is on the
textualist front. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit felt the issue was almost entirely
disposed of by a recitation of the text of the statute.112 Further, from the Ninth
Circuit’s perspective, to adapt a nexus requirement would “disregard the plain
language of the statute[.]”113 The Ninth Circuit’s impulse is not unfounded.
According to research performed by Professor Krishnakumar, textualism is
cited most often as the preferred interpretive lens by Supreme Court
justices.114 Moreover, it is an oft-cited and reasonable evocation of courts
that, when faced with a statute, interpretation must “begin, as always, with the
text of the statute.”115
However, notwithstanding the presentation of textualism as a sort of
interpretive gatekeeper, textual interpretation is not an absolute method for
resolving even apparently clear language in a statute.116 In his Chison v.
Roemer dissent, Justice Scalia laid out the textualist statutory interpretation
strategy:
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask
whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning
other than the ordinary one applies. If not—and especially if a good
112. The court felt further analysis beyond the text was unnecessary “because of the clarity of
the statute’s text.” MDY, 629 F.3d at 950.
113. Id.
114. This was an empirical study of the decisions from 2005 through 2008. I am relying upon
these numbers as a general trend, but of course, as membership of the Court shifts, these approaches
may shift as well. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era:
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 279 (2010) (Table 3).
115. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009) (quoting Permanent Mission
of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197 (2007)).
116. “It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in
order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude
consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278
U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
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reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that
ordinary meaning.117
This view of textualism has long been a part of the Supreme Court’s
approach to statutory interpretation. For instance, in the seminal statutory
interpretation case of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457 (1892), a Church contracted with a resident of England to come to the
United States and work as a pastor and rector.118 The United States
prosecuted, claiming that the contract was forbidden by the act of February
26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332, c. 164.119 The statute read in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . to prepay the
transportation. . . of any alien . . . under contract . . . to perform labor
or service of any kind in the United States[.]120
The Court acknowledged that the contract in question was certainly within
the letter of the Act, but was nevertheless not a transaction that Congress
intended to be punishable under the Act.121 In support of its holding, the
Court opined that “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers.”122 Moreover, the Court did not believe
that such an approach to legislative interpretation constituted a displacement
of the legislators’ will in favor of the judge’s.123 The Court based this
position on the fact that:
[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act.124
Along these lines, the Court has held that a literal interpretation of Title

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 457–58 (1892).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was inappropriate when considering
affirmative action programs.125 United Steelworkers v. Weber presented a
dispute over whether Title VII prevented private employers from voluntarily
implementing affirmative action plans.126 The allegation was that such
affirmative action programs constituted impermissible racial discrimination
under Title VII, which made it unlawful to “discriminate . . . because of . . .
race.”127 The Court rejected this literal interpretation of Title VII on the
grounds that it would effectively frustrate the intention of congress to
ameliorate the adverse conditions that black workers faced in the economy.128
In other contexts, textualism likewise has not presented an absolute barrier
to statutory interpretation. In Rapanos v. United States, for instance, Justice
Scalia found that the interpretation of the phrase “in the waters of the United
States” could not mean what it plainly said.129 To interpret the phrase to
literally mean every body of water in the United States would lead to the
absurd consequence of allowing the Federal Government to step over its
Constitutional limitations and regulate waterways that were purely within the
purview of State governments.130 Justice Scalia based this departure from the
plain text on the basis that such an interpretation would exceed the bounds of
the Commerce Clause.131
Thus, although textualism provides a strong anchor for most of the
members of the Supreme Court in one fashion or another, when there is a
statutory construction before it that may lead to absurd results or
unconstitutional implications, the Court is unlikely to end with the text in the
manner suggested by the Ninth Circuit in MDY.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain
recognized the nuance that attends to even avowedly plain text approaches to
statutes. “Congress chose [the language of §1201] consistent with its stated
intent to balance two sets of concerns pushing in opposite directions.”132 This
is to say, the words used in §1201 certainly are meant to provide a roadmap
for judges in understanding how to apply the DMCA to cases. They can only
be meaningfully understood by considering the whole context of §1201 within
the DMCA, the Copyright Act, and the general federal law.
However, even assuming for the moment that the Ninth Circuit’s strict
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 202.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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textualist preference is sound, and that we should only examine the printed
words of the statute, the no-nexus approach still doesn’t make obvious sense.
Sections 1201(a) and 1201(b) explicitly limit the scope of the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions to “a work protected under this title” – thus the
work protected by the circumvention provisions must be one also protected by
copyright law. Obviously, this would not apply to public domain works, or
works owned by authors other than a plaintiff. Section 1201(c) goes on to
state that “nothing in this section shall affect rights . . . under this title.”
Further, the right that the Ninth Circuit believes is created by §1201(a) is
not explicitly stated in the text—it is an inference of the section. The law
does not say something such as “Copyright holders shall now have an
additional right to control the use of their content.” It simply prohibits the
circumvention of TPMs. So, this begs the question: how can the law
explicitly say it will not affect rights, make no mention of the creation of a
new right, and yet be read with a strict textualist’s eye to hold that there is a
new property right created? Put simply, it cannot. In order to protect, a TPM
must have some object of protection. Protecting a work “under this title”
cannot be enough – it needs to protect a specific property right granted by the
Copyright Act. Taken as a whole, the strict textualist approach will not do the
work that the Ninth Circuit believes it can do.
2. Beyond Textualism
This Paper will not survey every canon of interpretation, merely the ones
that featured in either the MDY or Chamberlain opinions, or which appear
particularly relevant in light of the nature of the dispute. This section will
look at the use of legislative history; the judicial practice of avoiding
interpretations that render clauses superfluous; and the “golden rule”—the
mandate to avoid interpretations that reach absurd conclusions. Given these
interpretive lenses, this section will conclude with pragmatic considerations
based on empirical studies of the trends in judicial opinions.
a. Legislative History
Legislative History is one means of divining the legislative intent of the
Congress that enacted a particular statute.As noted above, in Church of the
Holy Trinity, the Court famously moved past the plain text of the statute to
examine “the evil which [the statute] is designed to remedy.”133 Indeed,
throughout much of the twentieth century, legislative history was relied upon
in construing statutes before the Supreme Court.134
133. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 457 (1892).
134. David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of
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The Ninth Circuit, believing that the textual structure of §1201
communicated a clear congressional intent to create an access right,135 made
much use of legislative history in reaching the MDY holding. Relying on the
Senate Judiciary’s Report, the Ninth Circuit observed the committee’s opinion
that “§§1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) are ‘not interchangeable,’” and that they were
“designed to protect two distinct rights.”136 Further, “§1201(a)(2) ‘is designed
to protect access to a copyrighted work,’ while §1201(b)(1) ‘is designed to
protect the traditional copyright rights of the copyright owner.’”137 The Ninth
Circuit went on:
The Senate Judiciary Committee proffered an example of §1201(a)
liability with no nexus to infringement, stating that if an owner
effectively protected access to a copyrighted work by use of a
password, it would violate §1201(a)(2)(A). [T]o defeat or bypass the
password and to make the means to do so, as long as the primary
purpose of the means was to perform this kind of act. This is roughly
analogous to making it illegal to break into a house using a tool, the
primary purpose of which is to break into houses.138
It of course bears acknowledging that in the case of breaking into a house
using thieves’ tools, the act of breaking into a house is always forbidden. In
such a case, it of course makes sense that a legislature may contemplate
banning those tools expressly designed for this purpose. Implied within the
very hypothetical is the nexus between the malum prohibitum and the means
of accomplishing it. However, in the case of §1201, you can be liable for a
wrong without ever having acted in a way that would otherwise violate the
law.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit took a different view
of legislative intent. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that Congress
intended to create new causes of action for circumvention and for trafficking
in devices that enable circumvention.139 However, “Congress did not choose
to create new property rights.”140 The Federal Circuit felt that to interpret
Congress’s words otherwise, would be to upset the balance of rights and
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1715 (2010).
135. According to the Ninth Circuit, “there is significant textual evidence showing Congress’s
intent to create a new anti-circumvention right in § 1201(a) distinct from infringement.” MDY
Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).MDY, 629 F.3d at 950.
136. Id. at 946–47.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 950 (citing S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 12).
139. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
140. Id.
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obligations in the Copyright Act, and to frustrate Congressional intent.141
Further, “Congress chose words consistent with its stated intent to balance
two sets of concerns pushing in opposite directions.”142 In the Federal
Circuit’s view, the DMCA developed broad categories for both liability as
well as exemption, and left the careful balancing of those interests up to the
courts.143
However, the divergence between the Ninth Circuit and the Federal
Circuit over the proper legislative history upon which to rely may be purely
academic. Legislative history has been an interpretive rule on the decline
over the last seventy years.144 In part, some of this decline is attributable to
the changing membership of the Court, but legislative history remains a
controversial source for judicial interpretation.145
Various problems have been noted with relying upon legislative history.
For instance, the Congressional Record, the official organ of Congress for
reporting proceedings and debate, contains not merely the records of actual
proceedings, but also “a large quantity of remarks and articles that were
inserted without actually having been read.”146 This leaves open the question
of whether the Record is intended to be an accurate collection of Congress’
deliberations, or is instead a collection of views that disparate members of
Congress had regarding a piece of legislation.147
Further, the contents of committee reports may even contain material that
was not able to make it through the political process in order to survive a
vote.148 However, even if legislative intent is a valid way to view an
ambiguous statute, it has been noted that legislative history provides, at best, a
problematic documentary record.149
Justice Scalia, while a judge on the DC Circuit, expressed clearly his
disdain for relying upon Committee Reports when interpreting statutes. He

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Law & Zaring, supra note 134, at 1715.
145. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 964 (2013).
146. OTTO J. HETZEL, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 472 (4th ed. 2008).
147. Id.
148. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent And Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423, 442. Farber and Frickey also outline generally how public choice theory and traditional
political science suggest that Congress members are largely content to rely upon committee reports
for explaining a law that comes before them.
149. Id. at 437.
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wrote:
I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as
opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee
report come to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house
which enacts the committee’s bill. And I think it time for courts to
become concerned about the fact that routine deference to the detail of
committee reports, and the predictable expansion in that detail which
routine deference has produced, are converting a system of judicial
construction into a system of committee-staff prescription.150
In essence, the reliability of legislative history is undermined by judicial
reliance upon it. Committee members write to the judges how they want
cases to come out and thus find a way to possibly short circuit the intent of the
broader legislature when it votes on the actual statutory language. There is
also concern that the legislators themselves never draft or even read the
committee reports that supposedly form the bedrock of legislative history.151
These critiques of legislative history are counterbalanced, however, by
indications that the drafters of legislation are aware of reliance upon such
history, and purposely write it as an explanatory rule.152 Further, at times,
when the House votes on a bill they have been known to defer to the relevant
committee as a proxy for doing their own research, and such committees at
times rely upon documents resembling legislative history in order to make
their own vote.153
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman have written a
recent article detailing their empirical research that highlights many
heretofore-unknown contours of the legislative process.154 Nearly 90% of the
respondents to Professor Gluck’s survey indicated that legislative history was
written purposely to serve as an explanation of a statute.155
However, notwithstanding this fact, there does remain a strong kernel to
the critique of legislative history. As unenacted text, it does represent a
150. Hirschey v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
151. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). In reaching his
conclusion in Hirschey, Justice Scalia cited an anecdote from the Senate involving Senator Dole.
Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 1 n. 1. Under questioning from Senator Armstrong, Senator Dole admitted that
he had not read nor contributed to the Committee Report prepared as part of a tax bill. Id.
Ostensibly, much of the construction of the law was therefore built upon the authorship of staffers
working for Senator Dole.
152. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 965–66.
153. Id. at 968-69.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 970.

STOUT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

208

5/15/2015 1:42 PM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 19:2

counter-democratic impulse to rely upon it when it very possibly could
contain language that is at odds with the language of the final enacted
legislation.
Professor Gluck acknowledged that there was potential pro-legislative
history bias among her respondents, as well. Professor Gluck’s research
shows that the people who write legislative history think legislative history is
important. Notably, the staffers indicated that the most important legislative
history was committee reports—the sorts of documents they themselves
drafted.156 They ranked floor speeches, and reports created outside the
committee system as the least reliable—the sorts of reports that would be
outside of the respondents’ control.157
Ultimately, Professor Gluck notes that, despite staffers insistence that
legislative history was intended as an interpretive tool, Congressional practice
made it difficult for courts to determine when messages in legislative history
were meant for them.158 While such history may be useful at some point,
likely it will not be so until Congress begins to indicate when it is speaking to
future courts regarding intent in a specific piece of legislation.159
However, even assuming that legislative history and intent may be useful
to the Court in examining §1201, the case still weighs against the Ninth
Circuit’s no-nexus approach. In light of the Copyright Act in general, and
1201(c) in particular, the Federal Circuit’s view regarding legislative intent is
far more plausible. Sections 1201(a) and 1201(b) explicitly limit the scope of
the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions to “a work protected under this
title.” Thus, for §1201 to apply, according to the clearly stated intent of the
framers of that provision, the work must be protected by copyright law. This
would not apply to public domain works, or works owned by other authors.
Further, §1201(c) states that, “Nothing in this section shall affect rights . . .
under this title.” Therefore, the rather clear intent of §1201, when viewed in
context of all of the anti-circumvention provisions taken together, cannot
mean that there is a right created that is unmoored from copyright law.
Moreover, what does it actually mean for Congress to intend to have a
clause that makes circumvention of TPMs protecting copyrighted works
prohibited? Why would this copyright protection be totally unconnected from
infringement? While the Ninth Circuit may try to shore up its position by
claiming that 1201(c) in fact prevents claims by anyone not owning a
copyright that is being protected by a TPM, this would not go far enough.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 978.
Id.
Id. at 989–90.
Id.
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The fact still remains that you can bundle small bits of copyrighted content
together with non-copyrighted content, as discussed supra, and be able to
claim a violation of §1201—even when the copyrighted material is not sought
by the circumventer.
In order to shore up the Ninth Circuit’s position, one would have to go too
far in the direction of gutting §1201. In this reading, if the intention of the
section was merely to protect works owned by the person asserting the
violation, the clause could apply when the only material behind the TPM was
copyright completely owned by the party bringing the claim, or when all
material behind the TPM was copyrighted material, and every piece of it had
been properly licensed to the party asserting the claim. This would certainly
help the Ninth Circuit’s position, but it would also prevent the protection of
any content on, for instance, web sites that sometimes host content from other
rights holders, or collections that bundle together the works of other authors.
Any works that curate public domain materials and include original
commentary could not work under this reading, since we would be trying to
prevent the absurd result of using a TPM to prohibit access to public domain
materials.
However, I do not think the Ninth Circuit’s position can be rescued
without an infringement nexus. I seriously doubt that the legislative intent
can be plausibly read in this case to suggest that Congress wanted to create a
loophole by which third parties can assert property rights in others’ copyrights
or in public domain works. Courts could certainly create schemes to try and
manage the wide variety of content arrangements and parse out how to
ascertain when a TPM circumvention was acceptable and when it wasn’t.
However, this is by far not the simplest mechanism available. The Federal
Circuit’s infringement nexus creates a very elegant solution. So what exactly
was the intent of creating §1201(a), particularly in light of the fact that by
requiring an infringement nexus, we essentially merge the actual
circumvention with the infringement?
I believe that §1201(a) plausibly makes an intent to infringe a new way of
enforcing existing rights. If a plaintiff can demonstrate circumstantial
evidence that a circumventer was trying to infringe upon a protected work,
even if they were not ultimately successful, or later had a change of heart after
acquiring the content, §1201 provides a cause of action. The important point
remains that the circumventer was attempting to use the content in a way
forbidden by the existing scheme of rights guaranteed but he Copyright Act,
and the anti-circumvention provision simply provide a new avenue for
enforcing those rights. In this reading, we avoid creating new property rights,
and we also give life to the intention of the framers that the existing rights to
works protected under the Copyright Act remain unaffected.
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b. Superfluities
The rule of superfluities directs judges and justices to interpret a statute in
such a way as to give effect to all the parts of a statute.160 However, this
canon is rather complicated within the context of §1201. On the one hand,
according to Gluck and Bressman, it may be entirely reasonable to expect
superfluous clauses to make their way into legislation.161
Gluck and Bressman have characterized the situation of statutory drafters
as being presented with “institutional barriers” that prevented them from
being able to avoid redundancy in statutes.162 According to Gluck and
Bressman, although 62% of the drafters in their study were aware that courts
assiduously attempted to interpret statutes in order to avoid superfluous
clauses, only 18% of respondents said such a consideration mattered rarely,
and 45% said it mattered sometimes.163
Two reasons were given to account for the rare consideration that the rule
of superfluities garnered from statutory drafters. First, drafters were foremost
concerned with covering all of the desired terrain, and erred “on the side of
redundancy to ‘capture the universe’ or ‘because you just want to be sure you
hit it.’”164 Second, drafters frequently face political and lobbying pressure to
include words and phrases, and they comply in order to make sure the bill
proceeds, even when there may be a redundancy.165
Moreover, this sort of political compromise doesn’t occur only in large
statutes where redundant language can be easily overlooked, but “even in
short statutes—indeed, even within single sections of statutes . . . terms are
often purposefully redundant to satisfy audiences other than courts.”166
On the other hand, the DMCA exists within the context of the Copyright
Act, and operates along side statutes such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”). The CFAA has long maintained a ban on unauthorized access
to computer systems in a manner similar to the Ninth Circuit’s view of
§1201.167 The crucial distinction is that the CFAA requires a showing of
damages in order to recover in a civil case.168 Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s
approach, the DMCA actually provides an end-run around the regime created
by the CFAA by allowing TPM’s to provide for damages.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Krishnakumar, supra note 114, at 243.
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 935.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2014).
Id. at § 1030(g).
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For instance, in 2003, a company sued a software contractor for accessing
its computer systems using a password protected VPN.169The company was
unable to prevail under the CFAA and electronic trespass claims because they
could not prove any actual damages.170 However, it did prevail on a motion to
dismiss because a VPN constituted a TPM within the meaning of §1201.171
The plaintiff was able to succeed in using a copyright statute to make a
“hacking” claim, where it could not succeed under the actual hacking law—
the CFAA.172
Similarly, Ticketmaster was able to obtain a preliminary injunction
against a company that had written software that evaded Ticketmaster’s
CAPTCHA system.173 While the CFAA was unavailable as a basis, owing to a
lack of demonstrable damages,174 the DMCA was available since the
CAPTCHA codes effectively prevented access to Ticketmaster’s copyrighted
webpages.175 Even though the activity in question was one that had no aim at
copyright infringement, indeed was a sort of harm wholly different from those
affecting copyright entitlements, Ticketmaster was able to prevail.
Thus, it appears that §1201 swallows up the carefully delineated
prohibitions of the CFAA. Congress considered what should be actionable in
the context of hacking and wrote that into law as the CFAA. However, when
drafting the DMCA, they (it would appear) inadvertently opened up a whole
new cause of action that effectively makes the CFAA superfluous.
There is another superfluity issue that works against the Ninth Circuit’s
holding. As discussed in Part III, supra, relying upon the Commerce Clause to
enact a paracopyright statute may have the effect of rendering the Copyright
Clause superfluous. Not only does the rule against superfluities work to retain
provisions of statutes, but the Court also relies upon it to ensure that clauses
of the Constitution are not nullified by particular constructions of a law.176
The Court is reluctant to disturb the “Framers’ conception of the respective
roles of the Commerce Clause and Clause 8.”177
Relying upon the Commerce clause to enact a provision of the Copyright

169. Pearl Investments v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D. Me., 2003).
170. Id. at 349.
171. Id. at 350.
172. Id.
173. Ticketmaster v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
174. Id. at 1113.
175. Id. at 1112.
176. Perzanowski, supra note 98, at 1101.
177. Id. Professor Perzanowki has observed that “[r]egardless of the precise scope of the
commerce power, intellectual property regimes of the sort found in the Patent and Copyright Acts
were thought to require a separate and additional source of authority.” Id. at 1102.
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Act that provides to copyright holders a new form of property right may be
just the sort of legislation that violates this principle. If Congress has easy
resort to the Commerce Clause to violate the Copyright Clause, the Copyright
Clause could become a nullity.
c. The Golden Rule
The mother of all consequentialist canons is undoubtedly the rule that
statutes should not be construed to produce absurd results. By definition, the
absurdity doctrine is oriented precisely to avoiding bad policy
consequences[.]178
The Federal Circuit recognized at least one glaring contradiction with a
no-nexus approach to §1201. That is, without an infringement nexus, the
Copyright Act could become contradictory.179 The court noted that §
1201(c)(1) explicitly directs that “nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including Fair
Use, under this title.”180 Thus, if § 1201(a)(2) truly were creating a new right
unmoored from the §106 list of rights, it would be in effect altering rights,
remedies and defenses under the Copyright Act.181
Moreover, not only does §1201(a)(2) potentially threaten Fair Use and
public domain material, but, read literally, it has the absurd effect of creating
a sort of property right in other holder’s copyrights. Were a person to include
a copyrighted fragment that they owned in a collection that also contained the
copyrighted works of a third party, theoretically they would have a cause of
action against a person who evades the technological protection in order to
access the work owned by another creator. Of course the wielder of §1201(a)
here would also be liable for copyright infringement for copying the work of
someone else, which only underscores the absurdity that such a literal “right”
would entail.
How does it makes sense that within the Copyright Act there is a
provision that would seemingly allow causes of action wholly unrelated to
actual copyright infringement? Particularly in light of the fact that Congress
had seen fit to establish a well known, and well prosecuted computer access
regime in the CFAA. Can it really be reasonable to presume that Congress
intended to short-circuit the balance of interests established in CFAA—
essentially contradicting itself with the DMCA?
The real world outcomes of a no-nexus §1201 have already developed in
178.
179.
180.
181.

Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011).
Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
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ways that are arguably absurd. For example, following the enactment of the
DMCA, the White House noticed a decline in security research related to
fears over anti-circumvention, ostensibly related to fears of violating the pure
access rights granted by §1201.182 In another case, a foreign programmer was
jailed when visiting the United States for having worked on a software
program that allowed users to convert a protected Adobe format into an
ordinary PDF, even without any alleged copyright infringement.183
Section 1201 has also supplied new tools for companies to use when
vying for market share. For instance, by relying upon §1201, Craigslist was
effectively able to prevent third-party services from providing automated tools
to allow users an easier means of posting Craigslist ads.184 In another case,
Nikon was able to use §1201 to obtain market leverage over Adobe and other
digital photo software companies by encrypting portions of the RAW format
their digital cameras use for storage – even without Nikon having any claim to
a copyright, and in a manner that aggressively undermines software and
hardware interoperability.185
There are more examples of legal action that severely stretches the
applicability of this provision within the Copyright Act to provide a catchall
computer access law. The salient point here, is that it is absurd to hold that a
provision of a copyright law could provide a powerful general legal tool
against computer use generally, particularly when existing laws already do the
work that §1201 is purported to perform.
However, the Ninth Circuit appears oblivious to the contradictions
embedded in the language of the access provision. The court claimed that the
access provision creates a right that is outside of traditional copyright
infringement, and yet is directed against copyright infringement.186 Without
realizing it, the Ninth Circuit there acknowledges that the very purpose of the
provision must require some connection to a protected right.
As discussed, supra, the Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of §1201 could
give a person the ability to apply a TPM to a public domain work, or even the
copyrighted work of another, and yet have recourse over third parties that
access that content by circumventing his TPM. The Ninth Circuit’s approach

182. Jonathan Band, Congress Unknowingly Undermines Cyber-Security, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (2002) available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/publications/JBandIPCyberSecurity.pdf.
183. Lawrence Lessig, Jail Time in the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES A7 (2001), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/30/opinion/30LESS.html.
184. Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
185. Michael R. Tompkins, Nikon Encrypts RAW File Data, IMAGING RESOURCE (2005),
available at http://www.imaging-resource.com/NEWS/1113977781.html.
186. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 946 (9th Cir. 2010).
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provides no principled basis for marking this sort of instance out from the
cases it envisions would properly operate within the provision.187 Thus,
without an infringement nexus, a broad reading of §1201 risks running the
statute into absurdity.
d. Pragmatic Considerations
There are two ideas that need to be considered in order to round out an
analysis of the interpretive landscape that a Supreme Court review of §1201 is
likely to meet. First, scholars have noted that, textualism and canons
notwithstanding, at times the Court comes down to a bare consequentialist
justification for its holdings.188
Professor Shachter noted, for instance, that Justice Scalia, the great
defender of textualism, would eschew a preferred reading of a statute if “it
would undermine settlement incentives, lead to expensive factual inquiries,
generate boondoggles, create a zany system, or produce perverse policy
results of various stripes.”189 She characterized Justice Scalia in these cases as
“straightforwardly consequentialist.”190
Consequentialism extends beyond Justice Scalia. In one term, Professor
Schachter recorded that consequentialism appeared prominently in 73% of the
Court’s decisions.191 Further, in another study of Supreme Court decisions
between 1890 and 1990, it was found that Consequentialist considerations
were featured in 28.8% of decisions.192
Given this propensity of the Court to look to the real consequences of a
law when choosing when and how to follow the text or the legislative intent, it
is reasonable to presume that the track record of §1201 will come under
scrutiny. The unexpected results offered, supra, when discussing the
avoidance of absurdities are far from isolated. MDY presented the case of a
person trying to make a profit by breaking Blizzard’s rules. Perhaps this was a

187. The Ninth Circuit opined that a valid extra-copyright entitlement provided by § 1201
includes something like a contractual enforcement mechanism. “[W]e would deprive copyright
owners of the important enforcement tool that Congress granted them to make sure that they are
compensated for valuable non-infringing access—for instance, copyright owners who make movies
or music available online, protected by an access control measure, in exchange for direct or indirect
payment.” Id. at 950. The oddity in this position, however, is that accessing a copyrighted work with
a computer and without the authorization of the creator is already an infringement insofar as § 106
defines the rights of the copyright holder as ones of use and authorization.
188. Schacter, supra note 178, at 1013–14.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1014.
192. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (1992).
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factor in the Ninth Circuit’s strict view of §1201. However, depending on the
case that reaches the Supreme Court, the facts may not be so easily construed
in favor of finding the access right without an infringement nexus.
Second, the Ninth Circuit pegged much of its holding to legislative
history.193 Immediately upon becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Justice
Scalia enjoyed a certain influence, even if unspoken, that has over time tended
to reduce reliance of the Court upon legislative history.194 Further, the Court
tends not to rely particularly upon pure textualism, legislative history, or the
Golden Rule, but instead uses a variety of interpretive tools in order to ensure
coherence in the law.195 Practically, this reinforces the sense that textualism
will not be the decisive mode of interpretation when construing §1201.
However, among the possible alternatives, how would the Court likely choose
its tools?
Anita S. Krishnakumar’s empirical study of the Roberts Court from 2005
through 2008 provides a guiding light for judging the outlines of the answer to
this question.196 Professor Krishnakumar classified the interpretational
methods of the Justices into a number of categories, of which, relevant to this
Paper are “Text/Plain Meaning,” “Practical Consequences,” “Whole Act
Rule” (which includes Superfluities), “Legislative History,” and “Intent.”197
Intent and Legislative History are by far the least often utilized tools
among the justices when reaching a holding.198 Text/Plain Meaning is the
dominant mode of interpretation found, with eight Justices using it as one of
their top three interpretative lenses.199 While, Practical Consequences is a top
three selection for six Justices, and the Whole Act rule is the third most
popular interpretive lens for seven Justices.200 Legislative History has only
four Justices relying on it as part of their holdings, and of them it ranks
second for one Justice, and third for three justices.201 Intent enjoys the least

193. Law & Zaring, supra note 134, at 1715.
194. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1983).
195. Krishnakumar, supra note 114, at 279.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 231–32. In all Professor Krishnakumar examines 14 different interpretive schemes.
However, as noted above, the likely conflict in a case over § 1201 will come between a side that
relies upon a Plain Text or Legislative History approach against a side that relies upon the spirit of
the Copyright Act or the practical consequences of § 1201 at large.
198. Id. at table 3. Each Justice was assigned a rank of the percentage of times they relied
upon a particular interpretation device.
199. Id.
200. Professor Krishnakumar used the Whole Act Rule to describe the sense in which an Act
must be viewed as a whole, and within the context of the law in which it operates. This includes the
notion of superfluities addressed supra Part IV.a.ii.2.
201. Id.
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popularity with just two Justices using it as their third most popular
interpretive lens.
Further, the Ninth Circuit’s extensive reliance upon legislative history
may be unfounded. Concomitant with Justice Scalia’s championing of the
“new textualism,”202 was the diminution of the practical effect of legislative
history from his early time on the court. The overall reliance upon legislative
history has been declining over time.
Brudney and Ditslear found that, when reaching decisions in statutory
interpretation cases, Legislative History was featured only 29% of the time by
1986.203 This was a decline from a high of between 40% and 50% in 1969.204
According to Law and Zaring, by 2004, just 11.1% of opinions featured
legislative history as a component in the holding.205
This evidence has only been reinforced by Professor Krishakumar’s
research showing the relative weakness of Congressional Intent and
Legislative History as interpretive tools in recent Supreme Court decisions.206
However, it is important to note that a Supreme Court rescue of §1201
would not be out of step with the expectations of those who draft
Congressional legislation, either. According to Professor Gluck, legislation
drafters regularly assume that courts will construe statutes in a way that
allows them to be upheld.207
Thus, pragmatically, it is most likely the case that the two pillars upon
which the Ninth Circuit constructed its holding are not quite as solid as
expected. Courts very rarely stop at the text—even obvious text. And when
the analysis proceeds, it is increasingly rare for the decision to turn upon the
weight of legislative history.
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, takes the textualist and
intentionalist view seriously, but remains focused on the larger context in
which the law operates. It noted that the DMCA does not create a new
property right for copyright owners, it merely allows for new grounds for
liability.208 This includes, of course, the trafficking in tools meant to aid in
circumventing TPMs in order to access copyright materials and, as I have
suggested above, could include the circumvention of a TPM as an intent to
202.
203.
Patterns of
(2006).
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Eskridge, supra note 194, at 623.
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222
Id.
Law & Zaring, supra note 134, at 1715.
Krishnakumar, supra note 114, at 279.
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 947–48.
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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infringe.
The Federal Circuit’s policy concerns are also very informative.
Particularly within the field of embedded software products, allowing
manufacturers of devices to prohibit use with competing products, §1201
would essentially grant manufacturers peculiar exemptions from anti-trust law
and the copyright misuse doctrine.209 Coupled with the observation that
§1201 provides for a shortcut around the strictures of a suit brought under the
CFAA, the no-nexus reading of the clause creates a troublesome set of legal
loopholes. The broader goal of the DMCA was to rebalance the interests of
the public against the rights of copyright holders in light of the expansion of
digital media.210 It is a mistake to construe the DMCA as creating expansive
new property rights that allow a disruption of traditional rights of the public,
including Fair Use and access to public domain materials.
CONCLUSION
Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the Ninth Circuit’s preferred
approach of textualism, supported by legislative history, is the proper way to
view §1201, the problems outlined in Part I, supra, remain. Section 1201 is
not clearly an enactment that is legitimate under the Copyright Clause power
of Congress. Moreover, as a paracopyright enacted under the Commerce
Clause, it will still likely be restricted as an exercise of Congress’s Copyright
Power.
However, as outlined in Part III, textualism will probably not be the end
of a Supreme Court analysis of §1201 anyway. Further, based upon the
empirical evidence, legislative history will not be the decisive factor in a
Supreme Court ruling. This is of course leaving aside the fact that the Federal
Circuit also offered support for its holding derived from a reading of
legislative history.
The Ninth Circuit claims that §1201(a)—with its focus on mere access
control—should be contrasted with §1201(c)—where the focus is on
protecting particular rights under the Copyright Act. This is because, in the
court’s view, the distinction clearly suggests that §1201(a) was intended to
create a new sort of right. However, this still does not rescue the Ninth
Circuit’s no-nexus approach. As noted by Professor Gluck, staffers will
frequently overdraft statutes in order to make sure they covered their intended
ground.211 Further, as discussed supra at length, it could not have plausibly
been the intention of Congress to create a property loophole in §1201, nor
209. Id. at 1193.
210. Id. at 1194.
211. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 145, at 947–48.
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could it have been the intention of Congress to require courts to parse the
infinite variety of media in order to ascertain when a rights holder would be
able to use §1201 for protection of their content. The Federal Circuit’s
infringement-nexus requirement is direct and focused, and solves the problem.
The textualist and intentionalist canons are read fairly with a nexus
approach. Congress explicitly stated that it did not intend to alter rights by
enacting the DMCA, and the clear language of §1201(a) states only a method
of protection, and does not clearly state that a new property right was being
created. Moreover, the policy concerns noted by the Federal Circuit –
including the fear of disrupting access to the public domain and Fair Use, and
a concern for providing an end-run around antitrust laws and the copyright
misuse doctrine – create a compelling reason to acknowledge the nexus
requirement.
The Ninth Circuit pointed out a valid superfluity concern in reading an
infringement nexus into §1201.212 The infringement-nexus approach could
effectively prevent a new cause of action for the pure violation of the TPM,
since, if there is an infringement anyway, there is no need for a cause for the
TPM violation.
However, this would only affect §1201(a)(1) since
§§1201(a)(2) and 1201(b), which prevent the trafficking in such technologies,
would still be operative. Persons who distribute technology that is intended to
enable persons to infringe the copyrights of others would still be liable under
§1201. While it may be argued that §1201(a)(1) becomes redundant, reading
the law in this way actually avoids making the entire CFAA redundant by
allowing §1201(a) to operate as a lower-requirement computer hacking law.
However, §1201 need not be redundant, even if there is an infringement
nexus requirement. As suggested above, the circumvention of the TPM can
amount to an “intent to infringe” when no actual infringement has occurred.
In this view, if circumstantial evidence can be martialled that demonstrates
the circumventer was actively trying to infringe upon a protected work when
bypassing the security mechanisms, there could be a cause of action. There
will still be an action for pure circumvention, and there will be an
infringement nexus—§1201 continues to function in a way that does not
generate new property rights, but merely affords a new method of enforcing
existing rights.
However, even granting the Ninth Circuit its superfluity concern that
concern is far from the only such superfluity concern to apply to the DMCA.
Without an infringement nexus, a major portion of the CFAA is rendered
duplicative. Further, if Congress were to rely solely upon its Commerce
power to extend a paracopyright copyright unmoored from the strictures of
212. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 946 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the Copyright Clause, the Copyright Clause would be reduced to a nullity. To
adopt the Federal Circuit’s infringement nexus requirement is to more
carefully constrain the operation of §1201. It would retain the existing
balance of rights in the Copyright Act and under the CFAA, and would avoid
the absurd consequences of turning the Copyright Act into a general computer
hacking statute.

